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Abstract
In this paper, I provide an argument for rejecting Sarah Moss’s recent account
of legal proof. Moss’s account is attractive in a number of ways. It provides
a new version of a knowledge-based theory of legal proof that elegantly resolves
a number of puzzles about mere statistical evidence in the law. Moreover, the
account promises to have attractive implications for social and moral philosophy,
in particular about the impermissibility of racial profiling and other harmful kinds
of statistical generalisation. In this paper, I show that Moss’s account of legal proof
crucially depends on a moral norm called the rule of consideration. I argue that we
have a number of reasons to be sceptical of this rule. Once we reject the rule, it is
not clear that Moss’s account of legal proof is either plausible or attractive.

Keywords: Probabilistic Knowledge, Mere Statistical Evidence, Legal Proof, Moral
Encroachment, Sarah Moss.
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This paper is about Sarah Moss’s attempt to use new work in epistemology to solve
an old problem in legal and social philosophy. The new work in epistemology is her
theory of ‘probabilistic knowledge’ (Moss 2018a). The old problem in legal and social
philosophy is the problem of mere statistical evidence. Her solution consists in defending
a novel version of a knowledge-based account of legal proof, from which she also develops
a unique account of what’s wrong with beliefs about specific individuals based on social
generalisations. I argue that her solution should ultimately be resisted.
This is newsworthy for three reason. First, Moss’s solution promises to deliver quite
a few attractive benefits. A number of philosophers have acknowledged the benefits of
a knowledge-based account of legal proof but have found that they come at too high
a cost. Moss’s new argument for this kind of account promises to deliver the benefits
while avoiding the costs. Second, her solution claims to not just solve a problem in
legal philosophy, but to have wider implications for moral and social philosophy; in
particular, about the rational permissibility of statistical generalisations in social life, and
the relationship between moral reasons and epistemic reasons. Third, the reason that
her solution fails is instructive. It relies on a mechanism called ‘the rule of consideration.’
The arguments I offer against the rule of consideration show that any account of how
we ought to accommodate probabilistic beliefs in legal and social life should do without
mechanisms of this sort.
This paper is in four parts. In section 1, I motivate the problem mere statistical
evidence presents for understanding legal proof. In section 2, I outline Moss’s proposed
solution and explain why it offers a very attractive way of thinking about knowledge,
probability, and legal proof. In section 3, I introduce the rule of consideration, and
outline the crucial role it plays in Moss’s theory of legal proof. In section 4, I present
two arguments for rejecting Moss’s application of her epistemological view to the issue
of legal proof. I also consider several ways the rule of consideration could be modified
to avoid my challenges, and explore the costs and benefits of these possibilities. The
central upshot of this paper is to show that in order for probabilistic knowledge to
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generate attractive solutions to problems in legal and social philosophy it must rely on
the rule of consideration, and we have good reasons to reject this rule as it’s currently
formulated.

1

The problem of mere statistical evidence

The problem of mere statistical evidence can be appreciated by considering another problem; namely, the problem of interpreting standards of legal proof. A simple and intuitive
way of understanding the various standards of legal proof is in terms of probability.1
According to this view, standards such as proof by preponderance of the evidence, proof
by clear and convincing evidence, and proof beyond a reasonable doubt, establish probability thresholds which must be met for a verdict of guilt or liability. For instance, to
find a defendant liable by preponderance of the evidence, it must be the case that the
factfinder judges it to be more than 0.5 likely on the evidence that the defendant is liable.
Similarly, to find a defendant liable by clear and convincing evidence, it must be the case
that the factfinder judges it to be more than, say, 0.75 likely on the evidence that the
defendant is liable.
Let’s suppose that the legal probabilist intuition is more or less correct: standards
of legal proof should be understood as picking our probability thresholds. The most
serious problem with this view is that it seems that verdicts about individuals could
be supported for each threshold merely on the basis of impersonal statistical evidence.
This problem is famously illustrated in a set of puzzle cases.2 Each of these toy cases
describe a situation in which statistical evidence seems to establish a specific probability
of guilt or liability, but we nevertheless feel reluctant to deliver such a verdict. The cases
present a problem for legal philosophy broadly, since it is puzzling in a general sense
why we might be reluctant to render a verdict of guilt or liability despite the presence
of highly probabilifying evidence. However, the problem is amplified if one thinks that
1 For
2 For

a recent articulation and defense of this view, see Colyvan and Hedden (2019).
helpful surveys, see Redmayne (2008) and Pardo (2019).
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standards of proof just are probability thresholds. In this case, the puzzle cases are
direct counterexamples. That is, they seem to show that verdicts of guilt or liability on
any standard of proof must involve more than meeting a probability threshold, and thus
standards of proof cannot be understood solely in terms of probability.
It will be worth looking briefly at some of the most prominent puzzle cases. Prison
Yard presents a case in the context of proof beyond a reasonable doubt (or something
very close to it), and Blue Bus in the context of a less demanding standard of proof,
such as proof by preponderance of the evidence.
Prison Yard: In an enclosed prison yard there are twenty-five identically
dressed prisoners and a prison guard. The sole witness is too far away to
distinguish individual features. He sees the guard, recognisable by his uniform, trip and fall, apparently knocking himself out. The prisoners huddle
and argue. One breaks away from the others and goes to a shed in the corner
of the yard to hide. The other twenty-four set upon the fallen guard and kill
him. After the killing, the hidden prisoner emerges from the shed and mixes
with the other prisoners. When the authorities later enter the yard, they find
the dead guard and the twenty-five prisoners. Given these facts, twenty-four
of the twenty-five are guilty of murder. There is a 0.96 probability, on the admitted facts, that any individual prisoner was involved in the murder. Thus,
it seems that any prisoner can be found guilty of murder beyond a reasonable
doubt (or something very close to it).3
Blue Bus: A car is negligently run off the road by a blue bus. The driver
of the car cannot identify the exact bus that caused the accident, but she
can prove that the Blue Bus Company operates 80 percent of the blue buses
in town, while another company operates only the remaining 20 percent.
There is a 0.8 probability, on the admitted facts, that the bus in question
was operated by the Blue Bus Company. Thus it seems that the Blue Bus
3 Prison

Yard was originally presented in Nesson (1979).
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Company can be found liable on a standard such as proof by preponderance
of the evidence.4
Mere statistical evidence doesn’t just present a problem for legal philosophy. It also
generates confusion about the permissibility of inferences in broader social life based on
statistical generalisations, especially inferences about individual people based on their
gender, race, sexual orientation, religion, and so forth. The problem consists in the fact
that our moral evaluation of such inferences tends to be negative, while our epistemic
evaluation of the same inference can very often be positive. In this sense, statistical
generalisations in social life present a dilemma between epistemic and moral concerns.
This makes it unclear what we all-things-considered ought to do when in a position to
draw an inference about an individual based on statistical evidence about members of
their reference class. For instance, Tamar Szabó Gendler’s Cosmos Club case illustrates
the tension between epistemic and moral evaluations of these kinds of inferences.
Cosmos Club: On the night before he is to be presented with the Presidential Medal of Freedom, John Hope Franklin hosts a celebratory dinner
party at the Cosmos Club. The Cosmos Club has very few African American
members, and all the other African American men in the club that evening
are uniformed attendants. While walking through the club, a woman sees
him, calls him over, presents her coat check ticket and asks him to bring her
coat.5
This case leaves us puzzled about what the woman ought to believe, since her epis4 The original inspiration for Blue Bus was Smith v. Rapid Transit 58 N.E.2d 754 (1945). For an
early discussion of the implications of the case for statistical evidence and standards of legal proof, see
Tribe (1971).
5 Gendler (2011). Gendler’s own view is that we ought to bite the bullet about the intractability of
this dilemma: sometimes being rational will involve violating some moral norms. She writes, “In short,
as long as there’s a differential crime rate between racial groups, a perfectly rational decision maker
will manifest different behaviors, explicit and implicit, towards members of different races. This is a
profound cost: living in a society structured by race appears to make it impossible to be both rational
and equitable.” (Gendler 2011, 57). Another puzzle about the rational permissibility of inferences about
individuals based on statistical evidence is the reference class problem. Individuals could be placed in
very many different references classes, which would justify a number of different, and in some cases
jointly incoherent, inferences about them. I’ll set this problem aside for the purposes of this paper. See,
Colyvan, Regan, and Ferson (2001) and Hájek (2007).
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temic reasons seem to pull her in one direction, and her moral reasons in another. It’s
worth noting here that the relevant question for our purposes is what the woman ought
to believe, not how she ought to act. Were the puzzle about how the woman ought to
act, the dilemma might easily be resolved; there is nothing especially puzzling about
believing p but acting as if ¬p in light of the expected utility of each option.
One way to solve the puzzle cases is to stipulate that mere statistical evidence is
always insufficient for legal proof. A number of philosophers have been attracted to the
idea that a knowledge-based account of legal proof provides a plausible solution along
these lines.6 According to this view, legal proof requires the factfinder to know that the
defendant is guilty or liable, and mere statistical evidence cannot lead to such knowledge. There are at least two strong motivations for the view that legal proof requires
knowledge. First, the view provides a simple explanation of the inadequacy of mere statistical evidence for legal verdicts. Second, there seems to be a very natural connection
between knowledge and legal proof. As Moss rightly emphasizes, when theorists attempt
to define legal proof they often focus on properties that are widely taken to be hallmarks
of knowledge. For instance, the following conditions have all been proposed as necessary
for legal proof: sensitivity to the truth, incompatibility with luck, capable of serving as
a reason for action, reliably safe from error, non-‘Gettiered’, and truth.7
However, despite these strong motivations, when one looks at specific standards of
legal proof, it starts to seem implausible that proof by all standards requires knowledge. For instance, civil matters tend to require proof by preponderance of the evidence.
It seems that proof by preponderance of the evidence can’t require knowledge since it
merely requires that the factfinder have a degree of confidence that is a long way from
what’s usually required for knowledge. Despite the many similarities between legal proof
and knowledge, it looks as though we shouldn’t help ourselves to the simple and ele6 For an early exploration of the idea that legal proof requires knowledge, see Thomson (1986). For
recent defenses, see Littlejohn (2017), Bloome-Tillmann (2017), and Smith (2018). For a helpful survey,
see Gardiner (forthcoming).
7 On sensitivity to truth, see Enoch, Spectre, and Fisher (2012). On incompatibility with luck, see
Thomson (1986). On reasons for action, see Nesson (1985). On safety from error, see, Pritchard (2015).
On legal proof and Gettier cases, see Pardo (2010). On truth, see Duff, Farmer, Marshall, and Tadros
(2007). See also Moss’s discussion of these views, Moss (2018a), 208–210.
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gant explanation of these similarities; namely, legal proof in general requires knowledge.
The incompatibility of knowledge with various standards of legal proof is significant
enough that Mike Redmayne, in his survey article on standards of legal proof, sets aside
knowledge-based accounts of legal proof solely because of this problem.8
We’ve seen that mere statistical evidence leaves us with a problem for understanding
legal proof in terms of probability and a problem for understanding legal proof in terms of
knowledge. For the legal probabilist, it seems that the mere statistical evidence featured
in the puzzle cases provides a powerful counterexample to understanding standards of
proof as probability thresholds. However, shifting to understanding standards of proof
as requiring knowledge doesn’t solve the problem. It seems that the salient standard in
many legal proof contexts is much less demanding than knowledge and in these contexts
the problem of mere statistical evidence remains. Moss’s innovative account of legal
proof offers a way to solve both problems at once.

2

Moss’s knowledge-based account of legal proof

Moss’s response to the problem of mere statistical evidence draws on her epistemological
theory of ‘probabilistic knowledge.’ According to this theory, probabilistic beliefs, such
as credences, can amount to knowledge in much the same way that outright beliefs
can. For example, we can know that it’s 0.6 likely that Amy is in Amsterdam, we can
know that Beth is probably in her office, we can know that it’s more likely than not
that Clementine will win the election, and we can know that it might snow in London
tomorrow. On Moss’s view, probabilistic opinions like these can amount to, or fall
short of, knowledge in all the familiar ways; in particular, by satisfying the most widely
accepted necessary conditions for an opinion to count as knowledge, such as being safe,
8 Redmayne writes: “There is an obvious problem with this view, however. It is plausible that
whatever prevents a liability verdict in Prison Yard also prevents a liability verdict in [the civil case]
Blue Bus. If Prison Yard is explained by a knowledge requirement for proof, then Blue Bus is too. But
that would involve arguing that civil as well as criminal verdicts require knowledge, and that is not
easy to accept. Civil verdicts require no more than proof on the balance of probabilities. This standard
seems too low to satisfy the degree of justification required for knowledge.” Redmayne (2008), 299.
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non-‘Gettiered’, and true.9
Her account turns on a novel conception of mental and semantic content. Moss’s
view is that many of our opinions have probabilistic content rather than propositional
content. Probabilistic content is something of a term of art for Moss, and the formal
details needn’t concern us too much for present purposes. However, it’s important to
emphasise that in her view probabilistic contents don’t reduce to propositional contents.
That is, when an agent knows that it might snow in London tomorrow, Moss would
reject the notion that this attitude could only be a full belief in a proposition about
probabilities, such as propositions about objective chances or evidential probabilities.
Rather, Moss holds that opinions can be modelled using sets of probability spaces and
these opinions can constitute knowledge.
Moss argues that one interesting implication of her theory of probabilistic knowledge
is that it provides a new way of understanding legal proof in general as requiring knowledge. Moreover, the account solves the two problems outlined at the close of section 1:
it provides a way for the legal probabilist to resist the notion that standards of proof can
be satisfied by merely statistical evidence and it provides a knowledge-based account of
legal proof that generalises across the various standards.
In particular, Moss’s notion of probabilistic knowledge is perfectly suited to solve
Redmayne’s problem, which holds that knowledge-based accounts of legal proof cannot
apply in weaker proof contexts. Probabilistic knowledge holds that probabilistic contents of various degrees of strength can constitute knowledge. On this view, then, there
is no problem with treating weaker contents picked out by standards such as proof by
preponderance of the evidence as candidates for knowledge. Moss uses this unique response to Redmayne’s problem to develop a new knowledge-based interpretation of the
standards of legal proof. On her account, a defendant is proved liable by preponderance of the evidence only if the judge or jury have greater than 0.5 credence that the
defendant is liable, and that credence constitutes knowledge. Likewise, a defendant is
9 For

a more detailed exposition of both Moss’s view and her arguments, see Smartt (2019).
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proved liable by clear and convincing evidence only if the judge or jury knows an even
stronger probabilistic content, and guilty beyond a reasonable doubt only if the judge or
jury knows a still stronger probabilistic content.10 In general, we might say that a standard of proof is met when the judge or jury knows a specific content – namely, the set of
probability spaces according to which the probability of guilt or liability meets or exceeds
the relevant threshold for the standard. Moss’s proposal preserves the legal probabilist
intuition about how to understand standards of legal proof. That is, she endorses the
view that each standard corresponds to a probability threshold. Indeed, I think that one
way to understand her view is as a specific version of legal probabilism, which adds a
further necessary condition to any legal standard of proof: the judge or jury must know
a probabilistic content which meets or exceeds the salient threshold. With this condition
in place, one can avoid Redmayne’s problem that a probabilistic understanding of the
various standards undermines understanding legal proof as requiring knowledge.
Furthermore, Moss argues that mere statistical evidence is usually insufficient for
probabilistic knowledge.11 Consider Prison Yard. On her view, the mere statistical evidence in this case fails to provide the factfinder with probabilistic knowledge.
Although it might justify a 0.96 credence in the claim that any individual prisoner committed the murder, this credence fails to be probabilistic knowledge. Thus you might
have a very high justified credence that Smith (say) is probably guilty, but you do not
know that Smith is probably guilty. This answer could then be filled out in a number
of different ways, since there are very many familiar reasons why a justified belief might
fail to constitute knowledge. However, the specific feature which Moss focuses on is the
condition that one does not know p if one is not in a position to rule out a contextually
relevant alternative to p. In the case of Prison Yard, a factfinder cannot know that
Smith is probably guilty, since the mere statistical evidence does not allow her to rule
out a relevant alternative; namely, that Smith is the one exception within the reference
10 Picking out a precise and invariant threshold value for the beyond a reasonable doubt standard can
seem arbitrary, and Moss notes that her view is compatible with holding that this value is contextsensitive. Moss (2018a), 212.
11 As we’ll see in section 4, Moss makes an important concession in the case of Blue Bus.
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class. Moss argues that not only does this solution show why the evidence in Prison
Yard fails to provide probabilistic knowledge that Smith is probably guilty, but it can
be extended to an explanation of the insufficiency of mere statistical evidence in other
proof contexts. Although the strength of the probabilistic content will vary as the standard of proof varies, the basic conditions on probabilistic knowledge remain fixed. So
even in proof contexts involving much lower probabilistic thresholds, the mere statistical
evidence might provide justification for a certain credence but not knowledge of this
content.
One attractive benefit of this solution to the problem of mere statistical evidence is
that it generalises beyond legal philosophy. For example, Moss treats statistical generalisation in social life in a similar way. In cases of social generalisation where our evidence
consists only of mere statistical evidence, we are unable to rule out the possibility that
an individual person is unlike an arbitrary member of their reference class. Thus we will
not be in a position to know that the individual probably has the target property.

3

The rule of consideration

Moss’s application of probabilistic knowledge to legal proof generates an interesting puzzle. The puzzle consists in the fact that, on Moss’s account, probabilistic knowledge of
lottery propositions and probabilistic knowledge in legal and social contexts are surprisingly disanalogous.12 In Prison Yard, Moss holds that we cannot know that Smith
is probably a murderer, since we are not in a position to rule out the possibility that
Smith is an unrepresentative member of his reference class. By applying the same reasoning to a lottery case, we meet the result that we cannot know that our single ticket
in a large lottery is probably a loser, since we are ordinarily not in a position to rule
out the possibility that our ticket is an unrepresentative member of its reference class,
12 This puzzle is not acknowledged in Moss (2018a), Moss (2018b), or Moss (forthcoming). Moss does
addresses some analogies between lottery knowledge and knowledge in legal and social contexts, but
doesn’t address the disanalogy between probabilistic lottery knowledge and probabilistic knowledge in
legal and social contexts. See, for example, Moss (2018a), 216–220, Moss (2018b), 187–188, and Moss
(forthcoming) §1 and §3.4.
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namely, the winning ticket. But this seems absurd! Knowing that one’s lottery ticket is
probably a loser is a paradigmatic instance of probabilistic knowledge. So it seems that
the approach to probabilistic knowledge in Prison Yard overgeneralises and rules out
probabilistic knowledge of lottery propositions.
The force of the puzzle can also be felt in the opposite direction. That is, if Moss
were to treat probabilistic knowledge of lottery propositions and probabilistic knowledge
in legal and social contexts analogously, this would lead to some very problematic results
for her account of legal proof. Suppose we can know that our lottery ticket is probably a
loser. By analogy, it would seem that we could sometimes come to know contents about
individuals based on mere statistical evidence or statistical generalisations. That is, if
we treat probabilistic knowledge of lottery propositions and probabilistic knowledge in
legal and social contexts analogously, we meet the unhappy results that we can know
that Smith is probably one of the murderers, we can know that Franklin is probably a
waiter, and so on. This would strike many philosophers as regress, not progress, in social
and legal philosophy. In any case, it’s exactly the opposite lesson Moss draws.
Perhaps to avoid this puzzle, Moss introduces an important piece of machinery –
called the rule of consideration – which will be the focus of my objections in section 4.
The rule states,
Rule of consideration: In many situations where you are forming beliefs
about a person, you morally should keep in mind the possibility that they
may be an exception to statistical generalizations. (Moss 2018a, 221)
Since the rule only applies to people and not objects, we are left with a fundamental
distinction between probabilistic knowledge of people and probabilistic knowledge of
objects (Moss 2018a, 218, 219, 223). This norm allows you to know that your lottery
ticket – an object – is probably one of the losing tickets, based only on the statistics
about members of the salient reference class. But the norm prevents you from knowing
that Smith – a person – is probably one of the murderers, based only on the statistics
about members of the salient reference class.
11

Moss also relies on the rule of consideration in her application of probabilistic knowledge to social philosophy. She argues that in cases involving potential probabilistic
knowledge of people we are morally obligated to consider the alternative that an individual person is an exception to the statistics. That is, in cases of profiling and social
generalisation we are morally obligated to consider alternatives which will block probabilistic knowledge. This leads Moss to develop a hybrid norm against profiling, which
spells out our epistemic obligations in contexts where the rule of consideration applies.
The hybrid norm holds that it morally ought to be the case that it epistemically should
not be the case that you form beliefs about people based on mere statistical evidence.
(Moss 2018a, 222ff).
If we consider Gendler’s Cosmos Case, this application has the attractive feature of
dissolving the tension between moral and epistemic evaluations of the woman’s inference.
It seemed that there’s a moral case for thinking the woman judged as she oughtn’t to
have and an epistemological case for thinking she judged as she ought to have. However,
Moss’s hybrid norm provides us with the result that had the woman been acting as she
morally ought to act, then it would have been the case that she epistemically ought not
to form this judgment. Thus, on Moss’s account, there is a sense in which refusing to
draw inferences about individuals based on statistical generalisation is not making an
epistemic compromise. Rather, it is judging as one epistemically ought to in cases in
which the moral rule of consideration applies.

4

Objections to the rule of consideration

In this section I raise two separate objections to Moss’s distinction between probabilistic
knowledge of objects and persons. The objections motivate my conclusion that we should
reject the rule of consideration – at least as it’s currently formulated. This is significant
since Moss relies on the rule to both avoid unattractive results about probabilistic knowledge and to build her positive case for the useful applications of probabilistic knowledge
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to legal and social philosophy. In light of these objections, I think we should resist Moss’s
claim about the legal and social applications of probabilistic knowledge.13

4.1

Applying the rule

My first objection is that there are cases in which it is unclear how we should apply the
rule; not because it’s unclear whether a specific item is a person or an object, but because
it’s unclear what you’re fundamentally forming your credence about. I think Blue Bus
provides us with such an example. In this case, it’s usually stipulated that we’re forming
credences about buses; that is, based on the statistical evidence of the case we can have
a 0.8 credence that the bus which caused the accident was operated by the Blue Bus
Company. But there are at least two other plausible interpretations of the object of our
credence in this case. First, our credence might be about the Blue Bus Company. That
is, based on the statistical evidence of the case, we might have a 0.8 credence that the
Blue Bus Company is the company responsible for the accident. Second, our credence
might be about a bus driver (every bus in Blue Bus has a bus driver, after all). That
is, we might have a 0.8 credence that the driver who caused the accident works for the
Blue Bus Company. So in Blue Bus, our attitude could be interpreted as about an
object, a group agent, a person, or perhaps a combination of all three.
In Moss’s own discussion of Blue Bus it actually isn’t clear whether the rule applies
to this case. Since the case is usually interpreted as involving credences about buses,
not people, it seems that the rule of consideration doesn’t apply in this case, and so
Moss entertains the idea that perhaps mere statistical evidence is enough to provide
13 Moss (2018b) provides further discussion of her theory of legal proof, the harms of profiling, the
nature of moral stakes, and the rule of consideration. Importantly for my purposes, Moss (2018b) makes
a slight revision to her position on the rule of consideration (see 191–192). The revision is that Moss
states that she does not believe that the epistemic impact of the rule of consideration is an instance of
moral encroachment (191). However, despite this clarification Moss (2018b) stands by the features of the
rule that motivate my criticism. In particular, she continues to assign the rule a substantial role in her
account of legal proof and social generalisations, and she continues to draw a fundamental distinction
between probabilistic knowledge of objects and probabilistic knowledge of people. Clarifying whether
or not the rule of consideration is an instance of moral encroachment is a welcome refinement to Moss’s
overall position, but this does not impact the arguments presented in this paper for rejecting Moss’s
account of legal proof.
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probabilistic knowledge in Blue Bus. However, she resists taking a firm stand about
the case. Moss does note that Blue Bus tends to generate more diverse intuitions than
Prison Yard. In particular, she writes that whilst verdicts of guilt or liability based on
mere statistical evidence involving people seem straightforwardly intolerable, “courts are
sometimes willing to act as if statistical inferences about objects can ground knowledge.”
(Moss 2018a, 219). I find it interesting that Moss resists making a judgment about Blue
Bus. One explanation for this hesitancy might be that it is not clear how we ought to
apply the rule in this case, and so it is not clear whether the statistical evidence in
the case can give rise to probabilistic knowledge. In Prison Yard, our credences are
unambiguously about people so the rule applies. But in Blue Bus, our credences are
open for interpretation. In the remark quoted above, it seems that Moss treats them
as being about objects. If this is true, then the rule needn’t apply, and Blue Bus
is analogous to a lottery case, and there is no principled reason why we cannot have
probabilistic knowledge in this case. That Moss declines to draw this conclusion could
be explained in many ways. Nevertheless, for our purposes I take it that one explanation
of her reluctance to make a judgment about Blue Bus is that it is unclear how to apply
the rule to this case.
So far, I’ve emphasised that it’s unclear how to apply the rule when one’s credence
isn’t paradigmatically about an object or a person. There are a number of ways that
credences might have this feature, and attempting to apply the rule to our credences
in Blue Bus helpfully illuminates at least two of these. First, sometimes attitudes are
about neither a person nor an object, for instance, they can be about a group agent.
Importantly for Moss’s purposes, attitudes about group agents don’t just feature in
fanciful thought experiments – they often occur in actual contexts of social and legal
importance. For instance, in civil cases like Blue Bus we’re interested in whether the
factfinder knows that the defendant is probably liable, and defendants can often be
corporate entities. I take it that Moss would want some version of the rule to apply
to cases involving group agents, otherwise her account would permit findings of guilt or
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liability about group agents on the basis of mere statistical evidence. Nevertheless, as
the rule currently stands, it’s not clear whether the rule applies in cases like this. Second,
sometimes our credences don’t refer de re to a particular entity, but they do refer to an
entity under the guise of a definite description. For instance, based on the statistical
evidence available in Blue Bus, we might have a 0.8 credence that the driver who caused
the accident works for the Blue Bus Company. But in this case, it’s not clear whether
the rule applies. Perhaps it does, since your attitude is about some person (although
you do not know who this is). But perhaps it doesn’t, since your attitude doesn’t make
a statistical inference about any particular person. Plenty of attitudes in weighty social
and legal contexts can have this feature. Here’s one motivation for thinking the rule
should apply in cases like this. Suppose I know very little about politics in New Zealand,
but – through a few occasional glances at international news – I do know the names of
some current politicians and the statistics about the gender distribution of all its Prime
Ministers. It’s not clear that the rule applies if I form a high credence that the Prime
Minister of New Zealand is probably a man, based just on the gender statistics. But it
is clear that the rule applies (and that I violate it) if I form a high credence that Jacinda
Ardern is probably not the Prime Minister of New Zealand, based just on the same
statistics. In light of this case, it seems to me that we have some reason to think that
the rule should apply to both attitudes, since the moral and epistemological differences
between them are fairly minimal. At the least, it is unsatsifying that it is not clear
whether the rule applies in cases like this.14
We’ve seen that trying to apply the rule to Blue Bus raises a number of complex
issues in respect to how our credences might fail to be paradigmatically about an object
or a person. Let’s set aside this particular case and consider a cleaner example which
captures the central worry I wish to raise; namely, that in many cases it’s unclear whether
the rule applies. Imagine the following case involving three rooms.15 The first room
contains 100 hats. The second room contains 100 people. The third room contains
14 Thanks
15 Thanks

to a referee for helpful comments on this point.
to a referee for suggesting this particular example.
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100 people, each of whom is wearing a hat. I take it that Moss would hold that the
rule of consideration applies when considering whether opinions about the people-only
room count as knowledge and that it doesn’t apply when considering opinions about
the hats-only room. Does it apply when considering whether opinions about the peoplewearing-hats room count as knowledge? If it doesn’t, this seems unmotivated, since it’s
not clear whether we should interpret credences about the entities in this room as about
objects or people. If it does, this leads to counterintuitive results. Suppose that in both
rooms containing hats, 96 hats are red and 4 hats are blue. If the rule of consideration
applies when forming opinions about the people-wearing-hats room, we get the result
that we can know, when conditions are right, that a randomly selected hat from the
hats-only room is probably red, but we fail to know, under the same conditions, that a
randomly selected person wearing a hat from the people-wearing-hats room is probably
wearing a red hat. At best, it seems unclear whether we should apply the rule in the
people-wearing-hats case. At worst, applying the rule here seems to provide strange
results when compared with nearby cases involving simply people or simply objects.16
Let’s take stock. I’ve outlined a general challenge that prevents us from clearly
applying the rule of consideration: sometimes our credences aren’t paradigmatically
about a person or an object. Sometimes they could be interpreted either way, as in
the case of an opinion about people wearing hats. Sometimes they’re about something
which is neither a person nor an object, as in the case of an opinion about a group agent.
And sometimes they can be about a person or an object in such a way that they fail to
pick out an individual, as in the case of an opinion about an entity under the guise of a
definite description.
How might Moss reply to this challenge? One option would be to broaden the rule
such that it applies when an opinion is at least partly about a person.17 This would
16 Thanks

to Daniel Greco and Caspar Hare for helpful comments on this point.
a referee helpfully pointed out, recent work on the topic of ‘aboutness’ in the philosophy of
language has provided new motivations for taking seriously the idea that sentences can be partly about
more than one subject matter at once, that sentences can be partly true, and that sentences can be
party or entirely about subject matters that they do not explicitly mention. See Yablo (2014).
17 As

16

provide the result that the rule clearly applies in cases involving people-object hybrids,
and in cases involving group agents, and would provide some motivation to think it also
applies in cases involving people under a definite description. So it looks like modifying
the rule along these lines would avoid the challenge I’ve outlined. But it also brings
its own costs. In particular, this modification requires care to ensure that it doesn’t
overgeneralise. For instance, some of the canonical lottery cases are partly about people:
people having surprise heart attacks, or people stealing cars, or people getting holes-inone.18 Were the rule to apply when an attitude is partly about a person, this would
make it difficult to have probabilistic knowledge in these kinds of cases. This would be
an unattractive result for at least two reasons. First, as noted in section 3, it seems that
probabilistic lottery knowledge – knowing that one’s lottery ticket is probably a losing
ticket – is a paradigmatic instance of probabilistic knowledge. Second, it’s plausible that
whatever we say about lottery knowledge should generalise to other cases with the same
structure. A modified rule would introduce a seemingly arbitrary distinction into the
kinds of lottery cases that are compatible with probabilistic knowledge. This division of
lottery cases would provide the results that, for example, we often can know that our
lottery ticket is probably a loser, but we often cannot know that all sixty golfers in a
tournament will probably not score holes-in-one on a single hole.19
18 See Hawthorne (2004), chapter 1. As McGrath (2004) puts it, “In effect, we enter a lottery when we
leave our parked cars (winners have their cars stolen), and even by being just by being alive (winners
die of a heart attack next year, or tomorrow).”
19 The hole-in-one example is Heartbreaker: “Sixty golfers are entered in the Wealth and Privilege
International Tournament. The course has a short but difficult hole, known as ‘Heartbreaker.’ Before
the round begins, you think to yourself that, surely not all sixty players will get a hole-in-one on the
‘Heartbreaker.’” (See Hawthorne (2004), 12). I take it that the rule of consideration would apply to
forming opinions about golfers in Heartbreaker based on statistical generalisations about how golfers
perform on the ‘Heartbreaker’, which would prevent you from knowing of any given golfer that they
probably won’t get a hole-in-one. The general point is that when a case includes (or entails) a lottery
proposition that is about (or partly about) people, such as golfers, the rule of consideration will often
block probabilistic knowledge, whereas when a case includes (or entails) a lottery propositions that is
only about objects, such as lottery tickets, the rule of consideration will not apply and probabilistic
knowledge will often be possible.
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4.2

Justifying the rule

We’ve seen that one possible way for Moss to avoid my first challenge is to stipulate that
the rule applies whenever a credence is at least partly about a person. We’ve also seen
that this threatens to overgeneralise, making it difficult to have probabilisitic knowledge
in a range of cases involving people. One way to avoid this overgeneralisation would be
to narrow the rule along a different dimension, such that it only applies when you risk
harming a person by forming a false belief about them based on statistical generalisations.20 This would provide a principled way of ensuring that the rule doesn’t apply
when an opinion is about (or partly about) a person but does not expose them to any
moral harm.21 This raises a second challenge that I’ll focus on in this section. The challenge is that it’s not clear what justifies a moral distinction between probabilistic beliefs
about objects and people. Moss says little about what justifies the rule, but everything
she does say has to do either with stakes or with concerns about respecting someone as
an individual. I’ll argue that neither justification grounds the moral distinction made by
the rule.
Let’s take stakes first. Moss writes that whether we should form a belief based on
20 As

a referee helpfully pointed out, if you think that statistical generalisations can be morally objectionable on grounds apart from risks of harm, then you may find this position unsatisfying. For example,
consider Rima Basu’s discussion of the Racist Hermit case. This case involves a hermit who forms a
belief about someone with whom they will never interact on the basis of a statistical generalisation. The
case stipulates that the belief has pejorative racial content, is never expressed, and is true. Basu holds
that such a belief still constitutes a moral wrongdoing. Those who share Basu’s intuition about Racist
Hermit might hold that the narrowed version of the rule of consideration discussed in this section fails
to capture the moral problem with statistical generalisations. See Basu (2019a), 919 and Basu (2019b),
2504.
21 Some philosophers have assumed that the rule should be interpreted this way. For instance, Daniel
Greco, in the context of discussing the rule of consideration, writes, “I assume I can know that someone
probably speaks some French, given that they grew up in Montreal. While they might be an exception
to the generalization that most people who grew up in Montreal speak some French, I assume there’s
no moral problem with failing to keep exceptions to that generalization in mind – i.e. failing to treat it
as a relevant alternative that must be ruled out if I am to have probabilistic knowledge – in attributing
to myself or others knowledge that they speak some French.” Greco notes that, “we’d like some story
about just what sorts of generalizations about people are ones whose exceptions must be kept in mind,
from a moral point of view.” Greco (2020), 114. Moss (2018b) gives us reason to think that she would be
sympathetic to this modification to the rule. She writes that “Whether statistical evidence is sufficient
for knowledge depends partly on what is at stake.” She claims that some kinds of profiling and opinions
based on statistical generalisations might be beneficial, and these opinions needn’t be subject to moral
encroachment. To support this, she provides an example involving the beneficial use of racial profiling
by medical experts when forming an opinion about the likelihood that an individual has a disease on
the basis of statistics about their racial group. See Moss (2018b), 200. See also Moss (2018a), 223–224.
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statistical inference “may depend partly on what is at stake if your belief turns out to
be false.” (Moss 2018a, 223). I’m inclined to agree. However worries about the stakes
involved in false probabilistic beliefs can be extended to objects too. For instance, take
a probabilistic belief about my single ticket in a billion-dollar lottery. It seems that I
can know that my ticket will probably lose the lottery. But this is a high-stakes belief –
I stand to lose a billion dollars if I’m wrong!
Perhaps Moss might reply that it is not stakes in general that we are interested in, but
moral stakes in particular, understood in terms of false beliefs which unacceptably run the
risk of causing harm to real people.22 However, it still seems that probabilistic opinions
about objects can have high moral stakes too. That is, I think a false probabilistic belief
about an object could harm a real person who is not themselves the object of the belief.
For instance, consider a probabilistic belief about the health of a fish I just caught in
Sydney Harbour. Suppose it’s the case that 96% of the fish in Sydney Harbour are
healthy and suitable for human consumption. On Moss’s view, if conditions are right,
I can know that this fish is probably healthy. However, there are moral stakes if I’m
wrong! If I’m wrong and I serve the fish to guests at my dinner party, I could cause
them all harm in the form of awful food poisoning. A number of probabilistic beliefs
about objects might serve as premises in practical reasoning in similar ways which risk
harming people if they are false.
Furthermore, we can think of an example where it’s initially not clear whether the
rule applies, because our attitude isn’t paradigmatically about a person or an object,
but were the moral stakes of the case to be raised, then it starts to seem like the rule
should apply. For instance, consider my example of the three rooms containing people,
hats, and people wearing hats. The upshot of this case was that it’s unclear whether
the rule applies to opinions about the people-object hybrids in the people-wearing-hats
room. Let’s suppose that in the previous case the people wearing red hats did so as
a mere fashion choice. Let’s now suppose that the red hats are official merchandise
22 Moss (2018b) makes it clear that she is primarily interested in the moral stakes associated with
probabilistic opinions, and less concerned with practical stakes in general.
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endorsing a controversial politician. In this modified case, the people wearing red hats
do so as an act of political expression. Let’s hold all the other details fixed. There’s
still 96 red hats and 4 blue hats in each room that contains hats; it’s just that now the
red ones also bear a political slogan. I take it that the rule still doesn’t apply when
forming opinions about the hats-only room; that is, we can know, when conditions are
right, that a randomly selected hat from this room is probably a red hat. But the
people-wearing-hats room now carries some moral stakes – by forming an opinion about
whether a randomly selected person from this room is probably wearing a red hat based
on the statistics about red hats in the room, we run the moral risk of falsely attributing
controversial political sympathies to her. So it seems like the rule should apply. But
notice that it’s the moral stakes that activate the rule, as it were. It’s no clearer that our
opinions in the high-stakes people-wearing-hats room are paradigmatically about people
compared with our opinions in the low-stakes equivalent. What has changed between
the two cases, is that our opinions in the high-stakes case now run moral risks which
they didn’t in the low-stakes case.23
The lesson is that moral stakes cannot justify the rule’s distinction between probabilistic knowledge of objects and persons since they don’t only attach to opinions about
persons. Moral stakes can sometimes attach to opinions about objects or opinions that
are neither paradigmatically about objects or persons.
I take it that one possible line of response to this problem will not be attractive to
Moss. That is, she could broaden the rule of consideration such that it requires that one
consider the possibility that a member of a reference class is unrepresentative – be it
an object, a person, or whatever – when one’s probabilistic beliefs about that member
generate moral risks for real people. This way of modifying the rule would provide the
results that I don’t know that the fish is probably healthy and that I don’t know that
a randomly selected person from the high-stakes people-wearing-hats room is probably
wearing a red hat. However, I take it that this reformulation would not be attractive
23 Thanks

to an associate editor for helpful comments on this point.
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to Moss as it would create problems for her account of legal proof. Plenty of legal evidence is probabilistic in nature.24 For instance, many different kinds of evidence drawn
from methods such as DNA testing, psychological evaluations, eyewitness testimony, or
forensic accounting can be associated with statistical information about the likelihood of
errors involved in each method. Since this evidence can feature in legal judgments that
run the moral risk of harming real people with inappropriate verdicts and punishments, a
much wider rule of consideration would require the factfinder to consider the relevant alternative that each piece of evidence is unlike typical members of its reference class. Were
this the case, probabilistic knowledge would be much harder to have in legal contexts,
as the factfinder would often not be in a position to rule out these relevant alternatives.
Even in contexts involving a low standard of proof, such as proof by preponderance of the
evidence, implementing this broadened rule would have the consequence that one often
fails to know the relevant content necessary for legal proof. For example, imagine a
factfinder considering whether it is at least 0.501 likely that Amy is liable for an offense.
The main evidence in the case is CCTV footage that seems to show Amy committing the
offense. Amy stands to be harmed by a false verdict, so the factfinder ought to consider
the possibility that the CCTV evidence is unlike most other CCTV evidence – which is
highly reliable – and has, say, been tampered with by Amy’s arch-nemesis. Where the
factfinder is not in a position to rule out this relevant alternative, the factfinder would
fail to know that it’s at least 0.501 likely that Amy is liable, and thus Amy could not be
found liable on even this low standard of proof. So I take it that broadening the rule to
apply to objects which pose moral risks to people will not be attractive to Moss.
So far we’ve seen that doubts can be raised about justifying the rule in terms of
stakes. I’ve provided reason to think that moral stakes can attach to probabilistic beliefs
about objects and people-object hybrids. For the reasons mentioned above, I suspect that
24 Some theorists think that all evidence is probabilistic in nature. For instance, Judge Posner writes,
“All evidence is probabilistic, and therefore uncertain; eyewitness testimony and other forms of ‘direct’
evidence have no categorical epistemological claim to precedence over circumstantial or even explicitly
statistical evidence.” See Milan v. State Farm Mutal Automotive Insurance Co. 927 F.2d 166, 170
(1992).
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Moss will not want the rule to extend to high-stakes probabilistic beliefs about objects.
The upshot is that it seems that a moral distinction between probabilistic knowledge
of persons and objects cannot be justified in terms of the moral stakes that accompany
each kind of attitude.
Here’s another possible justification for the rule that Moss seems to be sympathetic
towards: we are morally required to respect individual persons in a way that we are not
morally required to respect individual objects. That is, I suspect Moss could reply to my
challenges so far by asserting that we really do owe individual people respect in a way
that is different to the respect we owe to individual objects, even if symmetrical moral
risks attach to a token opinion about an object and a token opinion about a person.
But this justification makes the rule quite a controversial piece of normative ethical
theory. I take it that Moss will want her account of legal proof to be compatible with
many different views about, for instance, who is owed respect and why. Were the rule of
consideration to involve substantial moral commitments, its appeal – and, in turn, the
appeal of her account of legal proof – would be narrowed.
There’s no need to embrace too sceptical a conclusion at this point. Perhaps it’s
possible to justify the rule in moral considerations about respect for persons in a way
that avoids taking on divisive commitments in normative ethics.25 However, were Moss
to attempt to justify the rule in this way, I think she would face at least two challenges.
The first challenge is that Moss will not be able to straightforwardly help herself
to one of the most prominent accounts of respect; namely, Stephen Darwall’s account
of ‘recognition respect’ and ‘appraisal respect’ (Darwall 1977). Like Moss, Darwall is
interested in the kinds of respect morally owed to persons and objects. But he marks
this distinction quite differently. According to Darwall, we can owe ‘recognition respect’
to both persons and non-persons, including objects, institutions, and non-human parts
25 For instance, I think Moss could avoid the possible challenge that one could only justify the rule
in moral considerations about respect for persons by accepting a deontological moral framework. There
are good reasons to think that a respect for persons norm is available to a range of normative ethical
theories. For an argument that a fundamental moral requirement to respect persons is compatible with
a consequentialist moral framework, see Pettit (1989).
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of the natural world. ‘Recognition respect’ requires that we give appropriate weight in
our practical reasoning to some fact about the entity that generates this kind of respect,
and to then act appropriately. Sometimes ‘recognition respect’ generates distinctly moral
requirements. That is, sometimes respecting something in this sense will involve taking
into account some feature of the entity which places restrictions on what actions are
morally permissible. For example, on this sense of respect, the fact that a species of
flower is endangered can generate respect for the flower that constrains how we ought
to act towards it. ‘Appraisal respect’ has its exclusive object as persons, and consists
in the positive evaluation of a person’s actions or character. Darwall emphasizes that
this sense of respect doesn’t place moral constraints on our behaviour. Respecting a
person in this sense might generate prudential requirements or it might entail that we
ought to praise or admire the person, but ‘it doesn’t essentially involve any conception
of how one’s behavior towards that person is appropriately restricted’ (Darwall 1977,
41). For instance, if we respect a brilliant novelist or inspiring leader in this sense, it’s
not the case that we’re under any special moral requirements about how we ought to
treat them. It seems to me that Darwall’s account of respect will not help justify the
rule of consideration. The kind of respect that most closely resembles the rule’s moral
concern for persons is ‘recognition respect,’ but this is the kind that Darwall believes
can be owed to both persons and non-persons. The kind of respect that Darwall believes
is exclusively owed to persons doesn’t generate moral requirements like Moss needs and,
in any case, it doesn’t capture the sense in which the rule is concerned about respecting
persons.
Let’s set aside Darwall’s characterisation of different kinds of respect. Perhaps the
rule could be justified by the notion that we should treat people as individuals.26 This
strategy raises the second challenge; namely, that the requirement to treat a person as an
26 At some points, Moss suggests that the rule is justified in this way. For example, she says, “The
rule of consideration spells out one modest interpretation of the thought that we should treat people as
individuals...As I see it, there are actually several moral norms corresponding to the rough idea that
people should be treated as individuals, and the rule of consideration is among the least demanding of
these norms.” (Moss 2018a, 223, emphasis hers).
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individual needn’t support the rule of consideration. The rule requires that one keep in
the mind the possibility that a person is an exception to the generalisation. But I think
it’s plausible that one can treat a person as an individual without keeping this possibility
in mind. Let’s suppose that respecting a person as an individual involves being open to
the possibility that the individual is an exception to the statistical generalisation. There
are at least two plausible senses in which we might ‘remain open’ to this possibility. The
first is synchronic: at a time, you do not rule out the possibility that the individual is
an exception to the generalisation. This sense motivates the rule of consideration. The
second is diachronic: at a time, you do rule out the possibility that the person is an
exception, but you diachronically remain open to the possibility that the individual is
an exception by being disposed to update your attitude in light of new evidence. The
diachronic sense of ‘remaining open’ to the possibility that an individual is an exception
is compatible with violating the rule of consideration at a particular time-slice. I take it
that the diachronic sense of ‘remaning open’ is one plausible sense of the idea. You would
not remain open were you disposed to dismiss or discount evidence about the individual,
neither of which are true in the diachronic case. So it looks like the bare notion of
treating a person as an individual is not enough to justify the rule.27 One option would
be to attempt to justify the rule in a more specific notion of what is involved in treating
someone as an individual. For example, Eidelson (2013) and Wasserman (1991) argue
that the law ought to treat people as individuals by respecting their autonomous agency.
However, the more specific we get about what is involved in treating a person as an
individual, the harder it becomes to avoid controversial moral commitments.
I’ve argued that that we can raise challenges for justifying the rule in either of the two
27 An example of some philosophers who believe that treating a person as an individual is compatible
with violating the rule of consideration is Di Bello and O’Neil (2020). They write, “But treating someone
as an individual does not, on the most plausible interpretation, require eschewing reliance on (accurate)
generalizations. Rather, it only requires being receptive to the possibility that the individual is an
exception to the generalization—that is, being receptive to any finer-grained information that would
indicate that the generalization is not to be relied on in drawing a conclusion about the individual. . . But
a defendant in a trial is given an opportunity to introduce evidence that distinguishes them from their
group and is entitled to have this information taken into consideration by the fact finders. In a wellfunctioning courtroom, then, fact finders could use profile evidence without failing to treat the defendant
as an individual.” (Di Bello and O’Neil 2020, 154).
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ways that Moss is sympathetic towards; namely, in terms of moral stakes or in terms of
moral considerations about respecting individual persons. In light of this, it might be the
case that Moss needs to bite a bullet and justify the rule by accepting some substantial
moral commitments. At a minimum, it is not clear whether the rule can be justified in
a way that leaves it as morally uncontroversial as Moss takes it to be.

5

Conclusion

The advertised benefits of Moss’s innovative knowledge-based account of legal proof are
very attractive. I’ve argued that a crucial part of delivering these benefits is constraining
probabilistic knowledge in legal and social life with the rule of consideration, and I have
raised two separate challenges to the rule. For the legal and social benefits of probabilistic
knowledge to be secured, Moss owes us a deeper account of how to apply and how to
justify the rule of consideration.
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